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Abstract 
 
When scientists or science reporters communicate research results to the public, this 
often involves ethical and epistemic risks. One such a risk arises when scientific claims 
cause cognitive or behavioral changes in the audience that contribute to the self-
fulfillment of these claims. Focusing on such effects, I argue that the ethical and epistemic 
problem that they pose is likely to be much broader than hitherto appreciated. 
Moreover, it is often due to a psychological phenomenon that has been neglected in the 
research on science communication, namely that many people tend to conform to 
descriptive norms, that is, norms capturing (perceptions of) what others commonly do, 
think, or feel. Because of this tendency, science communication can produce significant 
social harm. I contend that scientists have a responsibility to assess the risk of this 
potential harm and consider adopting strategies to mitigate it. I introduce one such a 
strategy and argue that its implementation is independently well motivated by the fact 
that it helps improve scientific accuracy. 
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1 Introduction 
 
‘It ain’t what they call you, it’s what you answer to.’ (W.C. Fields)  
 
Science plays an important role in liberal democracies. One of its key functions is to inform 
public deliberation and decision-making (Kitcher [2011]; Anderson [2011]). To fulfill that 
function, scientists need to produce ‘public scientific testimony’, that is, oral or written claims 
about scientific results, theories, or research that are directed at lay-people (Gerken [2019], p. 
1). In the context of COVID-19, climate change, and other pressing social problems, now 
more than ever, public scientific testimony is critical and highly salient, as the public depends 
on scientific expertise to understand and tackle these problems (Posetti and Bontcheva [2020]; 
Kitcher [2020]).  
 
While public scientific testimony clearly plays a vital epistemic role in society, many 
philosophers of science have argued that it also comes with significant ethical and epistemic 
risks for the public (Forge [2008]; Kitcher [2011]; Keohane et al. [2014]; Alexandrova [2018]; 
Keren [2018]; Gerken [2018]).1 Focusing on one of them, it has been noted that social scientific 
classifications and claims can in some cases contribute to bringing about their own truth, 
resulting in negative social consequences (e.g., Hacking [2007]; Kourany [2016]; Peters 
[2020a], [2020b]).  
 
For instance, it has been argued that scientific claims about cognitive differences between men 
and women, including assertions about men’s higher scores in mathematics tests, can be 
harmful by leading the recipients of these claims to expect women to be less capable in 
mathematics (Fine [2012]; Kourany [2016]). This can cause people to think or act in ways that 
bring about a self-fulfillment of these claims: women may subsequently be or feel discouraged 
to study mathematics or perform more poorly out of fear of confirming (or disconfirming) 
others’ expectations (‘stereotype threat’).2 This can contribute to a reproduction of the 
cognitive difference at issue (Schwartz [1997], p. 24; Fine [2012]). I shall refer to cognitive 
and/or behavioral changes that are caused by and contribute to the confirmation of scientific 
claims as self-fulfilling effects.  
 
The harm of public scientific testimony tied to self-fulfilling effects has so far only been 
discussed in the context of testimony about gender and race differences (Fine [2012]; Kourany 
[2016]), mental disorders (Hacking [2007]), criminal conduct (Kuorikoski and Pöyhönen 
[2012]), implicit biases (Saul [2018]), and political polarization (Peters [2020a]).3 It might thus 
seem that the ethical and epistemic problems connected to these effects of scientific testimony 
are confined to a relatively small sub-set of such testimony. Furthermore, questions as to 
																																																								
1 For instance, in aiming to communicate their findings effectively to laypeople so that they can understand and use 
them, scientists might oversimplify results (Forge [2008]), ignore the value judgments underlying their conclusions 
(Alexandrova [2018]), or fail to acknowledge uncertainty (Keohane et al. [2014]). 
2 I will return to and assess the empirical data on stereotype threat as well as Fine’s, and Kourany’s arguments in 
section 4.2. 
3 This paper builds on, generalizes, and explores the normative implications of the line of thought developed in 
Peters ([2020a]).  
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whether there is a particular and robust psychological process driving pernicious self-fulfilling 
effects, whether scientists are responsible for them, and how to counteract these effects remain 
largely unexplored in the theorizing on scientific testimony.4 Here I want to start changing this. 
I shall argue for the following points.  
 
(1) The ethical and epistemic problem with self-fulfilling effects of public scientific 
testimony is likely to be much broader than hitherto appreciated, arising with respect 
to a wide range of common public scientific generalizations about negative features of 
individuals, groups, society, and social structures.  
(2) It often does so because of a psychological phenomenon that has been neglected in the 
work on scientific testimony, namely that many people tend to conform to ‘descriptive 
norms’ – norms capturing (perceptions5 of) what others commonly do, think, or feel 
(Cialdini et al. [1990]; Cialdini [2003]; Prentice [2007]; Peters [2020a]). Due to this 
tendency, scientific testimony can produce significant social harm.  
(3) Scientists have a responsibility to assess the risk of this potential harm and consider 
adopting strategies to mitigate it. One such a strategy involves linguistic restrictions of 
the generality of scientific claims, and the implementation of this strategy is 
independently well motivated by the fact that it helps improve scientific accuracy. 
 
In arguing for (1)-(3), I shall not defend the claim that in all cases of public scientific testimony 
about negative features of individuals, groups, society, and social structures, problematic self-
fulfilling effects will arise. The overall point is more modest. It is that often, in a wider range of 
cases than so far noted, the effects at issue are likely to emerge.  
 
I begin the discussion by specifying the kind of public scientific testimony relevant here. I will 
then connect it to descriptive norms, before making the case for (1)-(3).  
 
2 The Relevant Type of Scientific Claims 
 
There are different kinds of public scientific testimony (Alexandrova [2018]; Jamieson et al. 
[2017]; Gerken [2019]). It is useful to characterize the one relevant here by focusing on three of 
its dimensions: its source, content, and scope.  
 
2.1 The source of the claims 
 
When it comes to the source of public scientific testimony, we can distinguish between 
‘scientific expert testimony’ and ‘science reporting’ (Gerken ([2019], p. 2): scientific expert 
testimony is public scientific testimony whose direct sources are scientific experts themselves 
(including research institutions) and whose audience is lay-people. In contrast, science 
reporting is indirect, mediated, and offered by agents who frequently (but not always) lack 
scientific expertise about the relevant domain. Newspaper journalists, business associations, or 
																																																								
4 There is, for instance, no mentioning of them in Forge ([2008]), Anderson ([2011]), Kitcher ([2011]), Jamieson 
et al. ([2017]), or Gerken ([2018]; [2020]). 
5 I use ‘perception’ in this paper broadly to include non-perceptual beliefs. 
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governments reporting scientific findings could be examples. Since many science reporters and 
some government actors do have expertise and training in the scientific fields they report on, 
the two groups of testifiers referred to here are not always mutually exclusive but might 
overlap.  
 
Moreover, and importantly for the following discussion, both types of public scientific 
testimony share a key feature: overall, the public6 assigns a high degree of trust and authority to 
them compared to non-scientific claims (Funk and Rainie [2015]; Jamieson [2017]; Cacciatore 
et al. [2018]; Sanz-Menéndez and Cruz-Castro [2019]). With these points in mind, in the 
following, whenever I use the term ‘public scientific testimony’ (henceforth ‘PST’), I shall refer 
to both scientific expert testimony and science reporting. 
 
2.2 The content of the claims 
 
The content of PST may differ depending on the science it concerns. The sciences can be 
divided into four main branches (Trefil and Hazen [2009]): (i) the natural sciences, which study 
nature in the broadest sense (e.g., biology, chemistry, physics), (ii) the social sciences, which 
study individuals, groups, society, or relationships between them (e.g., economics, psychology, 
political science), (iii) the formal sciences, which study abstract concepts (e.g., logic, 
mathematics, computer science), and (iv) interdisciplinary science, which combines elements of 
(i)-(iii). Corresponding to (i)-(iv), four different kinds of PST can be distinguished. I will only 
be concerned with PST from (ii) and (iv), more specifically, with testimony that involves social 
scientific and/or interdisciplinary claims about individuals, groups, society, or social structures. 
These claims are henceforth the sole referents of the term ‘PST’. The reason for this narrow 
focus is that the kind of self-fulfilling effects discussed below are best illustrated and 
corroborated by empirical data with respect to these particular claims.7 
 
Among them, we can further distinguish between assertions about properties viewed as positive 
or conducive to the functioning of individuals, groups, society, and/or social structures, and 
claims about properties viewed as negative or detrimental to it (e.g., maladaptive behaviors). 
While the positive vs. negative distinction might not always be easy to draw, it is clear enough 
that it can be drawn. The following discussion will focus primarily on PST about negative 
features. This is because even though self-fulfilling effects might also occur with respect to 
positive features [e.g., Duguid and Thomas-Hunt [2015]; Peters [2020b]), the potential harm of 
PST is (as will become clearer below) more closely linked to claims about negative than 
positive features. 
 
 
 
																																																								
6 The public should not be reified as a monolithic entity though; it might be highly heterogeneous with respect to 
the individuals and groups it contains; see O’Connor and Joffe ([2014]). 
7 Some of the effects relevant here might also arise from natural scientific generalizations (e.g., that endocrine 
disruptors cause infertility). However, the underlying social psychological processes are likely to be distinct; see 
also Turnwald et al. ([2018]). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising the issue.  
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2.3 The scope of the claims 
 
While some social scientific claims might only be about a single individual, the ones relevant 
here involve, as PST typically does, generalizations about several individuals, that is, social 
groups, nations, social structures, and so on  (Little [1993]). Two kinds of generalizations can 
be distinguished. These are (1) generalizations expressed with explicit quantifiers (e.g., ‘many’, 
‘most’, ‘all’, etc.), collective nouns (e.g., ‘U.S.A.’), or percentiles to describe the sample or 
functional relations at issue in the testimony (e.g., ‘90% of people are biased’), and (2) 
generalizations expressed by generics, which are statements without explicit quantifiers.  
 
Generics capture broad claims about a kind (i.e., a category as a whole; e.g., men, teachers, 
African-Americans, etc.) as opposed to individuals (Leslie [2017]). Generics are pervasive in 
many social scientific publications. For instance, DeJesus et al. ([2019], pp. 18370–18375) 
analyzed 1,149 psychology articles published 2015 to 2016 and found that ‘generics were 
ubiquitously used to convey results’ in claims about a ‘wide range of categories and constructs: 
People, women, children, adults, people with schizophrenia’, and so on. Given their 
pervasiveness, it becomes interesting to explore the social effects of such claims. In what 
follows, I will thus focus on PST with board generalizations that involve generics, large 
percentiles, collective nouns, and/or wide-scope quantifiers (e.g., ‘most’, ‘all’, ‘always’, etc.). 
 
In sum, then, the type of PST relevant here has three features. It (a) comes directly or 
indirectly from a scientific source, (b) captures social scientific and/or interdisciplinary claims 
pertaining to negative properties of individuals, groups, society, or social structures, and (c) 
expresses broad generalizations of the types just mentioned. From now on, I shall use the term 
‘PST’ as shorthand for claims displaying (a)-(c).  
 
Notice that even though PST is but a sub-set of scientific testimony, it is large (see, e.g., 
DeJesus et al. [2019]) and highly relevant. After all, communicating to the public research 
results that pertain to negative or harmful characteristics of individuals, groups, society, or 
social structures is important for enabling informed policy-making to counteract them. To 
illustrate these points and give concrete examples of the type of claims that will be in the center 
of the discussion, consider the following ten instances of them (found via a quick Google 
search): 
 
(1) ‘Men resist green behavior as unmanly.’ (Scientific American [2017])8 
(2) ‘Americans eat too much processed meat.’ (American Association for the 
Advancement of Science [2019])9 
(3) ‘People [on social media] are quicker to repeat something that’s wrong than 
something that’s true.’ (NBC [2018])10 
(4) ‘U.S. voter turnout is low.’ (Pew Research Center [2018])11 
																																																								
8 https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/men-resist-green-behavior-as-unmanly/ 
9 https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2019-06/e-ase061719.php 
10https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/fake-news-lies-spread-faster-social-media-truth-does-n854896 
11  https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/21/u-s-voter-turnout-trails-most-developed-countries/ 
	 6	
(5) ‘90% of people are biased against women.’ (BBC [2020])12 
(6) ‘Most Republicans and Democrats view each others as more closed-minded than 
other Americans.’ (Pew Research Center [2019]) 
(7) ‘[S]mart people are more susceptible to [accepting] fake news.’ (The Guardian 
[2019])13 
(8) ‘[C]onservatives in the United States are substantially less likely than liberals to 
accept that human-caused climate change is happening, and less likely to support 
climate policies.’ (Yale Climate Change Communication [2019])14 
(9) ‘Britons are uniquely reluctant to wear [COVID-19] face masks.’ (YouGov [2020])15 
(10) ‘Unreliable and false information is spreading around the world to such an extent, 
that some commentators are now referring to the new avalanche of misinformation 
that has accompanied the COVID-19 pandemic as a “disinfodemic”.’ (United Nations 
[2020])16 
 
I shall remain agnostic on the truth, plausibility, or evidential support of (1)-(10) and other 
claims displaying features (a)-(c). What I am interested in is how people respond to statements 
of this kind, that is, to PST.  
 
3 From Public Scientific Testimony to Descriptive Norms 
 
It is useful to begin by considering psychological research on how people process broad 
generalizations about individuals or groups, in general, before returning to PST in particular. 
Psychological research on social norms will be especially relevant in this context. 
 
3.1 The psychology of social norms 
 
In investigating social norms, psychologists distinguish between ‘descriptive norms’ and 
‘prescriptive norms’ (Cialdini et al. [1990]; Cialdini [2003]). Prescriptive norms are taken to 
capture (perceptions of) what characteristics and/or behavior members of a group should (or 
should not) display according to some moral standard (e.g., politicians should be honest).  
 
In contrast, descriptive norms are taken to be norms capturing (perceptions of) what features 
members of a group in fact commonly do display, no matter whether they should or should not 
(Cialdini [2003]). That is, prima facie, descriptive norms merely describe what is widespread or 
typical in a social environment, including ‘what most people in a group think, feel, or do’ (e.g., 
college students party a lot during spring break, CEOs sleep less than 8 hours a night, etc., 
Prentice [2007], p. 629). Notice that this is the notion of descriptive norms often used by 
psychologists (e.g., Cialdini et al.). There are other ones proposed by other researchers (e.g., 
																																																								
12 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-51751915 
13 https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/apr/01/why-smart-people-are-more-likely-to-believe-fake-news 
14 https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/reducing-ideological-bias-on-climate-change/ 
15 See YouGov graphics at: 
https://yougov.co.uk/topics/international/articles-reports/2020/05/02/international-covid-19-tracker-update-
2-may?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=website_article&utm_campaign=covid_intl_tracker_2_May 
16 https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/04/1061592 
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philosophers, see Muldoon et al. [2014]; Bicchieri [2017]). 17  I shall here adopt the 
psychologists’ notion and terminology because they are now standard in psychological research 
(see studies reviewed below). 
 
With these clarifications in place, the key point to note for present purposes is that PST, 
including examples such as claims (1)-(10), is likely to convey descriptive norms. This is 
because of its broad and ambiguous scope. For instance, on a natural reading, claim (1) (see 
above) conveys that men commonly resist green behavior, claim (2) that Americans commonly 
consume unhealthy amounts of processed meat, (3) that social-media users spread falsehoods 
faster than truths, (4) that US voters are commonly less inclined to vote, (5) that people are 
commonly biased against women, (6) that Republicans and Democrats commonly view each 
others as closed-minded,18 (7) that smart people are commonly more susceptible to fake news, 
(8) that conservatives are commonly less likely than liberals to support climate policies, (9) that 
Britons are commonly reluctant to wear COVID-19 masks, and (10) that unreliable and false 
information about COVID-19 is common among people and spreading globally.  
 
Claims (1)-(10) do not have to be read these ways. But given their unconstrained scope, they 
are likely to be interpreted thus by the public. That is, they are likely to convey (perceptions 
of) what features are common among certain people. Since, in doing so, such generalizations 
convey descriptive norms, members of the public are likely to take PST such as (1)-(10) to 
indicate descriptive norms. What, then, do we know about the effects of descriptive norms on 
people’s behavior and/or cognition?  
 
3.2 Empirical data on the impact of descriptive norms 
 
A wide range of different studies suggests that many people tend to conform to descriptive 
norms. I shall briefly review a selection of experiments testing effects of descriptive norms on 
behavior and cognition.  
 
As for behavior-related research, in one study, (Californian) households informed that they 
used more electricity than all the others households in their neighborhood subsequently reduced 
their energy consumption, whereas households informed that they used less than all others 
increased it (Schultz et al. [2007]). In another study, hotel guests informed that ‘most people 
reuse’ their hotel towels were subsequently significantly more likely to do so19 than guests 
given environmental reasons for that action (Goldstein et al. [2008]). Similarly, U.S. lunch-
goers informed that most people in the U.S. consume high levels of meat tended to order more 
meaty lunch meals than controls (Sparkman and Walton [2017]), and students told that only a 
minority of their peers engaged in water conservation subsequently increased the amount of 
water they used compared to controls (Mortensen et al. [2019]). The same type of conformist 
behavioral responding has been found with respect to majority information about various 
																																																								
17 Bicchieri ([2017], p. 19) defines them as a ‘pattern of behavior such that individuals prefer to conform to it on 
condition that they believe that most people in their reference network conform to it’. 
18 For further discussion on this particular type of PST and its negative self-fulfilling effects, see Peters [2020a]) 
19 The number of towels washed decreased by 26%. 
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socially highly relevant actions, for instance, paying taxes (Hallsworth et al. [2017]), as well as 
corrupt behavior (Ko ̈bis et al. [2015]) and readiness to steal (Cialdini et al. [2006]).  
 
Turning from descriptive-norm effects on behavior to effects on cognition (e.g., motivation, 
intentions, biases, etc.), presenting subjects with statements conveying descriptive norms 
emphasizing low (expected) voter turnout (in an election) elicited less motivation to vote than 
messages emphasizing high turnout (Gerber and Rogers ([2009]). Also, students told that most 
of their peers do not eat healthily (but think people should do so) subsequently reported 
significantly lower intentions to eat healthily themselves compared to controls (Staunton et al. 
([2014]). Additionally, individuals informed that the ‘vast majority of people’ harbour 
stereotypes that bias their social evaluations subsequently showed themselves more stereotyping 
in their own social evaluations than those told that only very few people are biased by their 
stereotypes (and controls) (Duguid and Thomas-Hunt [2015]).  
 
Intriguingly, descriptive norms have also been found to affect subjects’ perception of how others 
should act. In one study (Roberts et al. [2019]), children (4- to 9-year-olds) and adults were 
presented with two groups of fictional characters, ‘Hibbles’ and ‘Glerks’, described in terms of 
their positive/negative behaviors (e.g., Hibbles make babies smile/cry; Glerks give people 
flowers/punches). The test participants were then asked to evaluate a dissenting individual 
(i.e., a Hibble/Glerk not conforming to what its group was doing). Across ages, participants 
tended to judge, for instance, a Hibble that, unlike other Hibbles, made babies cry as worse 
than a Glerk that, like other Glerks, did the same thing. Similarly, individuals tended to view a 
Glerk that, unlike other Glerks, made babies smile as worse than a Hibble that, like other 
Hibbles, did the same thing (Roberts et al. [2019], p. 382). That is, many test participants 
expected individuals to conform to a group’s descriptive norms, even though the participants 
themselves did not belong to that group, and even when these norms were clearly morally 
problematic. 
 
Notice that many of the experiments just mentioned were field studies, that is, they were 
conducted in naturalistic contexts ensuring high ecological validity (see Schultz et al. [2007]; 
Goldstein et al. [2008]; Gerber and Rogers [2009]; Sparkman and Walton [2017]; Hallsworth et 
al. [2017]). Moreover, there are various other studies on descriptive norms specifically 
venturing outside the laboratory, reporting the same kind of overall findings from a wide range 
of different domains (see, e.g., Cialdini et al. [1990]; Mollen et al. [2013]; Peters [2020a]). 
Given this, there is reason to assume that many subjects tend to conform to descriptive norms 
in many different contexts. 
 
Notice too that while most of the studies just reviewed manipulated descriptive norms by 
directly providing summary information in the messages (e.g., ‘most people reuse their 
towels’, ‘the vast majority stereotype’, etc.), this is not required for the effects at issue to 
occur. Indeed, other research found that subjects frequently form perceptions of descriptive 
norms by inferring these norms (often incorrectly) from simply observing others, their 
comments, and the media (e.g., advertisements suggesting pervasiveness of smoking, drinking, 
etc., Bosari and Carey [2003]; Nan and Zhoa [2016]; Lui and Shi [2019]). 
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3.3 Strength of the data 
 
Given recent replication failures in the psychological sciences (Bird [2018]), it is worth noting 
that when it comes to the effects of the kind at issue here, meta-analyses of experiments on 
descriptive norms confirm the reality of the phenomenon. For instance, in the most recent 
meta-analysis, Melnyk et al. ([2019]) assessed 297 studies on the impact of descriptive norms on 
consumer decision-making processes. They also contrasted the effects of descriptive norms with 
those of prescriptive norms so as to attain comparative insights into their distinctive causal 
contributions. Melnyk et al. ([2019], pp. 4, 13) found that, overall, descriptive norms ‘directly 
influence behavior’ (not only intention formation) and their effect on behavior is generally 
‘stronger than that of prescriptive norms’. This meta-analysis and several individual 
experimental studies that manipulated the scope20 of descriptive norms to track causal norm-
behavior links (Kormos et al. [2014]; van Wagner et al. [2019]) suggest that descriptive norms 
do often exert a significant causal influence on behavior. Similarly, but related to these norms’ 
effects on cognitions, Rivis and Sheeran ([2003]) assessed 14 studies (total sample size N=5810) 
covering a wide range of behavioral domains, and they found ‘strong evidence in support of the 
predictive validity of descriptive norms’ in ‘intention formation’ (p. 228).  
 
The efficacy of these norms is perhaps also not difficult to explain. For instance, as Cialdini et 
al. ([1990]) notes, they seem to ‘motivate by providing evidence as to what will likely be an 
effective and adaptive action’, the underlying rationale being: ‘If everyone is doing or thinking 
or believing it, it must be a sensible thing to do or think or believe’ (p. 203). Similarly, 
Bicchieri ([2006]) writes that ‘[w]e conform because such norms make life easier for us, 
because we want to “fit in”’ (p. 29).  
 
Notice, however, that even though there is good ground to hold that descriptive norms often 
prompt conformist behavior, they do not always do so, and do not always do so equally 
powerfully across domains. There are contexts and domains where they have not been effective 
(Richter et al. [2018]; Paryavi et al. [2019]). And some kinds of descriptive norms (e.g., 
dynamic norms, or don’t- vs. do-norms) have been found to be more powerful than others 
(Sparkman and Walton [2017]; Mortensen et al. [2019]; Bergquist and Nilsson [2019]; Peters 
[2020a]). I shall thus assume a qualified and explicitly quantified view here: that in many (vs. 
all) domains descriptive norms are often (vs. always) likely to have the effects discussed. 
 
4 Revisiting Public Scientific Testimony 
 
The data discussed in the preceding section are relevant for the normative theorizing on public 
scientific testimony. This is because, as noted, PST frequently communicates descriptive 
norms. In fact, some of the studies just mentioned can be viewed as involving actual cases of 
PST doing precisely that. The reason is that the participants in them were laypeople in 
naturalistic settings presented with statements capturing broad, social scientific generalizations 
																																																								
20 For instance, test subjects were told that 20%, 50%, or 80% of previous participants acted in a certain way; the 
boarder the scope of the descriptive norm (e.g., 50% vs. 80%), the stronger the effect on intention to act 
(Kormos et al. [2014]; Van Wagner et al. [2019]). 
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(e.g., about energy consumption of their neighborhood, people’s voting behavior, 
stereotyping, etc.) that came directly or indirectly from scientific sources (i.e., psychologists, 
political scientists, science reporters, etc.). The subjects were thus in much the same situation 
as they are when receiving PST via TV, online, newspapers etc. in everyday life.  
 
Importantly, the descriptive-norm effects were in many cases clearly harmful. For instance, 
when participants learned about higher energy consumption in their neighborhood, a low voter 
turnout, or the prevalence of stereotyping, this increased their energy consumption, decreased 
their voting inclination, and increased their stereotyping. Since, as noted, various different 
studies found the same phenomenon with different property ascriptions in diverse domains, 
there is an inductive basis for assuming that the ethical and epistemic problems that this raises is 
likely to arise with respect to a wide range of PST.  
 
To make this more concrete, consider again the abovementioned examples (1)-(10). Prima facie, 
these claims and instances of PST seem ethically and epistemically innocuous. But they also 
explicitly or indirectly (e.g., (10)) indicate to an audience that the cognitive and/or behavioral 
features described in the claims are common among people. That is, they involve broad social 
scientific generalizations (e.g., ‘90%’, ‘most Republicans’, etc.) or generic nouns (‘men’, 
‘Americans’, etc.), and so indicate descriptive norms. And importantly, these claims come 
from authoritative sources, that is, sources that the public commonly trusts (e.g., news outlets, 
science associations, scientists, UN, etc.). Since that is so, given the data on the directive 
impact of descriptive norms just reviewed, there is reason to believe that claims (1)-(10) are 
also likely to contribute to self-fulfilling effects among the public receiving these claims and 
belonging to the demographic groups concerned. These effects include (1) reluctance towards 
green behavior among men, (2) increased meat consumption among Americans, a (3) 
proliferation of falsehoods among social media users, (4) low U.S. voter turnout,21 (5) bias 
against women, (6) affective polarization among Republicans and Democrats,22 (7) acceptance 
of fake news among ‘smart’ people, (8) decreased support for climate policies among 
conservatives, and so on. 23  All of these consequences are evidently ethically and/or 
epistemically problematic.  
 
To be sure, no experiment yet exists that tests whether the kind of self-fulfilling effects 
encountered in the studies reviewed earlier will also occur with respect to the specific PST in 
claims (1)-(10). But independently of claims (1)-(10), as mentioned, many of the experiments 
on descriptive norms discussed earlier can in fact be viewed as involving actual instances of PST 
on their own: they involve public (descriptive-norms conveying) claims by scientific or 
otherwise authoritative sources about negative features (see, e.g., Schultz et al. [2007]; 
																																																								
21 This example could be construed as conveying a negative descriptive norm: ‘Americans don’t vote’. It is worth 
noting that there is evidence that don’t-descriptive norms are in fact more powerful in eliciting conformity than 
do-descriptive norms (see Bergquist and Nilsson [2019]).  
22 For a development of this point with respect to political polarization, see Peters [2020a]. 
23 What are the cues and immediate social environments that activate norm-conformist responding? Just as in the 
studies discussed above, they will differ depending on the content of the descriptive norm; e.g., after exposure to 
a descriptive norm about green behavior, the cues and immediate environments might include green vs. non-green 
products and choice situations in supermarket. 
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Goldstein et al. [2008]; Gerber and Rogers [2009]; Staunton et al. [2014]; Duguid and Thomas-
Hunt [2015]). So even if one is skeptical about generalizing from the reviewed studies to (1)-
(10), the preceding discussion already directly supports the claim that in some cases PST leads 
to negative, descriptive norm related self-fulfilling effects.  
 
And it is not unmotivated to go further to the assumption that such effects are likely to also 
arise at least in some cases with respect to (1)-(10). This is because some of (1)-(10) are very 
closely related to the statements used in the studies reviewed (see claim (2) and Sparkman and 
Walton ([2017]), claim (4) and Gerber and Rogers ([2008]), claim (5) and Duguid and Thomas-
Hunt ([2015])) or are supported by other studies (e.g., descriptive norms in the context of 
promotions of health-risk behavior; see Rivis and Sheeran [2003]; Cialdini [2003]).24  
 
Moreover, we have so far no reason to believe that when it comes to the other claims belonging 
to (1)-(10), the descriptive norms mechanism discussed is interrupted or absent. And even if in 
the cases of (1)-(10), descriptive norms are less powerful and self-fulfilling effects less frequent 
or weaker than those found in the studies discussed, claims of the type at issue are very widely 
broadcast nationally and internationally (e.g., on the BBC). This means that even only very 
modest self-fulfilling effects in individual cases might still accumulate to significant overall social 
harm.  
 
Finally, suppose there is only a slight chance that the preceding considerations are correct and 
that claims such as (1)-(10) result in self-fulfilling effects. Given what is at stake (e.g., 
environmentally friendly behavior, spread of misinformation, voting, etc.), this would arguably 
still make it reasonable, if not rational, to take the considerations above seriously and reflect on 
ways of how the potential pernicious effects outlined could be avoided.  
 
Adding to this point, while in some of the claims (1)-(10), the PST at issue concerns only a 
particular sub-set of individuals (e.g., men, U.S. voters, etc.), even when it comes to recipients 
of PST who are not themselves mentioned in the PST, the claims are still likely to incline the 
recipients to expect members of groups who are mentioned in the PST to act in ways 
conforming to the descriptive norm. The support for this assumption comes from the 
abovementioned study by Roberts et al. ([2019]). Roberts et al. found that study participants 
presented with descriptive norms of a group to which the participants themselves did not even 
belong still subsequently tended to disapprove of norm-violating behavior among members of 
that group. It is thus not unreasonable to assume that people’s expectations to the effect that, 
for instance, men resist green behavior, Americans eat too much meat, ‘fake news’ spread 
quickly on social media, etc. might in subtle ways bias their social interactions such that self-
fulfillment effects25 become more likely – not least in the sense of reducing people’s surprise 
when they actually encountering such behavior (Peters [2020a]). Additionally, as a result of 
																																																								
24 For instance, Cialdini ([2003], p. 105) mentioned the negative effects of descriptive norms in the context of 
claims that ‘alcohol and drug use is intolerably high, that adolescent suicide rates are alarming’, and ‘that rampant 
polluters are spoiling the environment’. 
25 Such social expectations can also contribute to pernicious instances of ‘mindshaping’ by eliciting behavioral 
confirmation and triggering ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’; see Peters ([2020b]). 
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being informed that certain negative features are common among people, recipients of that 
information might feel absolved from responsibility if they subsequently display such features 
themselves (see also ‘moral licensing effects’; Blanken et al. [2015]; Saul [2018]). This too can 
further increase the distribution of them.  
 
4.1 Qualifications of the argument 
 
What I have said so far is compatible with granting that there are many cases in which PST does 
not produce self-fulfilling effects. As noted at the outset, the claim here is not that receiving 
PST will always trigger such effects in an audience. For instance, there might be PST claims that 
do not capture any specific behavior that subjects could conform to. Or there might be PST that 
the recipient distrusts, or motivated cognition might prevent an uptake of the claims (Gerken 
[2019]).26 The subjects involved might then not interpret the PST as conveying descriptive 
norms, or might not conform to them. The argument here is only meant to support the view 
that, given the data discussed, there are also a wide range of cases in which the mentioned 
effects are likely to arise, that is, when the PST captures specific behavior and the public trusts 
it, which is frequently the case (Sanz-Menéndez and Cruz-Castro [2019]).  
 
The overall argument here is qualified in another way. It grants that claims such as (1)-(10) 
might have overall more significant ethical and epistemic benefits than the costs linked to self-
fulfilling effects. Relatedly, the preceding considerations are not intended to suggest that claims 
of the type captured in (1)-(10) should never be made. The point is just that even if the ethical 
and/or epistemic benefits of the proliferation of PST such as (1)-(10) outweigh the costs tied to 
self-fulfilling effects, we still have empirical reasons to believe that these effects are real and 
often problematic in a wide range of cases of PST. They should thus be taken into account in 
the theorizing on the ethical and epistemic consequences of PST.  
 
I have left open a number of interesting questions. For instance, how far into the domain of PST 
exactly can the point just made be generalized? How significant is the self-fulfillment problem 
in actual science communication contexts? These questions call for a detailed analysis. I shall set 
them aside for now. The goal here is to motivate asking them, draw attention to the problem to 
which they pertain, and provide reasons to believe that this problem is likely to be widespread 
in the context of PST. In the next section, I will argue that it is in fact more widespread than so 
far appreciated in work on science communication.  
 
4.2 A neglected issue 
 
The preceding considerations have been largely overlooked in both the literature on descriptive 
norms and the theorizing on PST. For instance, in the empirical literature on descriptive 
																																																								
26 Recent studies suggest, however, that people tendency to follow descriptive norms might in some cases even be 
stronger than their motivated cognition in favor of (e.g.) their political in-group: Pryor et al. ([2019], p. 1) found 
that, ‘[c]ounter to self-categorization theory’s prediction’, informing ‘participants that an action was unpopular 
amongst people they did not [politically] identify with led participants’ preferences to shift away from that action. 
These results suggest that a general desire to conform with others may out-power the common in-group vs. out-
group mentality’. For discussion, see Peters ([2020a]). 
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norms, the focus in discussions of experimental results is typically only on how descriptive 
norms can be used by, for instance, policy-makers to bring about positive social change (for 
explicit statements, see Gerber and Rogers [2009]; Duguid and Thomas-Hunt [2015]; Walton 
and Wilson [2018]; Lede and Meleady [2019]). This is an important question. But it seems 
equally vital to consider the responsibility of scientists for the negative social change that their 
testimony might (inadvertently) cause due to the directive impact of descriptive norms.  
 
Some detrimental effects of descriptive norms have been discussed in the context of ‘public 
service announcements’ (i.e., messages directed at the public, produced by governments or 
private institutions to raise awareness of, and alter attitudes and behavior towards social issues; 
Cialdini [2003]). But the problem at issue has so far gone largely unnoticed in the context of 
scientific testimony and, more specifically, in the discussion of the responsibility of scientists. 
None of the papers cited so far relates the work on descriptive norms to the impact of PST on 
the public.  
 
Of course, this is not a criticism of the scientists who conducted the studies. The link between 
descriptive norms and PST is not obvious. Moreover, the problem with self-fulfilling effects 
highlighted here is largely a normative one. As such, it may not be of interest to social 
scientists, who might, even if they have noticed it, view it as falling into a field of inquiry 
outside their expertise or training such as ethics or philosophy more generally (Nagel [1961]; 
Wolpe [2006]).  
 
But unfortunately, philosophers too have so far not paid much attention to the problem of PST 
self-fulfilling effects related to descriptive norms. To be sure, in philosophy of science, Hacking 
([1995], [2007]) has influentially argued that social scientific classifications of individuals as 
‘autistic’, depressive, criminal, immigrant, and so on can cause behavioral changes in these 
individuals such that a ‘new scientific classification may bring into being a new kind of person, 
conceived of and experienced as a way to be a person’ (Hacking [2007], p. 286). Hacking holds 
that the behavioral and cognitive changes triggered by the classifications may in turn trigger 
revisions in the classifications in order to ensure they reflect these changes, a phenomenon he 
calls ‘looping effects’. While Hacking’s ideas are connected and congenial to the points made 
here about self-fulfilling effects, he has not yet considered the role of descriptive norms in the 
context of how social scientific classifications might ‘make people up’ (Hacking [2007]). And he 
has not yet discussed the related implications specifically when it comes to science 
communication. 
 
But some other philosophers of science have touched on similar issues. For instance, Fine 
([2012]) argues that neuroscientific claims might have pernicious self-fulfilling effects. Yet, she 
focuses ‘primarily only on claims of the type that the female brain is hardwired for empathizing 
while the male brain is hardwired for systemizing’ (Fine [2012], p. 286). Similarly, in her 
argument that certain scientific research and claims ‘should be banned’ (inter alia) because of 
their harmful self-fulfilling effects, Kourany ([2016], p. 779) concentrates only on research and 
testimony related to cognitive differences between gender and race groups. Neither Fine nor 
Kourany consider whether the kind of problem of a self-fulfillment of scientific claims might in 
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fact be highly general, potentially arising even for prima facie unproblematic claims (e.g., about 
meat eating, voting, social media use, etc.).  
 
Moreover, neither Fine nor Kourany consider empirical data specifically on descriptive norms 
but rely on results from studies pertaining to, for instance, ‘stereotype threat’ (Fine [2012], p. 
288; Kourany [2016], p. 781). Stereotype threat is the fear that one’s behavior may confirm, or 
be interpreted in terms of, a negative stereotype linked to one’s social group. This fear is 
thought to decrease one’s performance on tasks associated with a stereotype-relevant domain 
by drawing cognitive resources away from task performance towards self-regulatory, fear-
suppression processes (Steele [1997]).  
 
No doubt, stereotype threat is linked to self-fulfilling effects: by leading subjects to 
underperform in stereotype-related tasks, it may contribute to a confirmation of stereotypes  
(e.g., when the activation of the stereotype that women are bad at math reduces women’s 
performance in math tests; Schmader et al. [2008]; Guyll et al. [2010]). As Fine and Kourany 
rightly emphasize, some PST might trigger stereotype threat and so cause pernicious self-
fulfilling effects.  
 
However, notice that in these cases the underlying psychological mechanism is distinct from the 
one underlying PST self-fulfilling effects related to descriptive norms. For instance, descriptive 
norms need not capture stereotypes, and acting in line with them need not involve any 
underperformance anxiety but might just be based on self-interest (Bicchieri [2006], p. 26). 
Indeed, most of the PST and descriptive norms mentioned above (e.g., ‘men resist green 
behavior as unmanly’; ‘Americans eat too much processed meat’; etc.) are very unlikely to elicit 
the specific type of self-related anxiety found in stereotype threat, for they do not invoke any 
kind of ‘underperformance’ to begin with. This means that the detrimental self-fulfilling effects 
of the PST at issue here are not covered or easily explicable by stereotype threat, and so the 
problem with PST self-fulfilling effects highlighted here is much more general than that of 
stereotype-threat related effects that Fine and Kourany mention.  
 
Notice too that the empirical basis of the argument introduced above is more robust than that 
of their argument. Because even though the initial studies on stereotype threat found 
statistically significant effects (Nguyen and Ryan [2008]), subsequent re-analyses (Zigerell 
[2017]) and other studies failed to replicate them (Finnigan and Corker [2016]; Flores et al. 
[2019]). In contrast, meta-analyses of studies on descriptive norms repeatedly confirmed the 
reality of the type of self-fulfilling effects discussed above (e.g., Melnyk et al. [2019]). The 
argument developed here thus does not only invoke a different psychological mechanism and is 
broader in scope. It also enjoys stronger evidential support than Fine’s, and Kourany’s points. 
 
Suppose, then, the argument is on the right track. To what extent, if any, are social scientists 
responsible for the pernicious self-fulfilling effects that might arise from their PST?  
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4.3 Scientists’ responsibility for self-fulfilling effects 
 
It is widely accepted that scientists have a moral duty toward society to avoid causing harms to 
society and prevent wrongful outcomes and omissions that they are in a position to foresee 
(Douglas [2009], p. 83; Resnik and Elliot [2016], p. 36). That this is a moral obligation on social 
scientists, in particular, rather than a mere suggestion is supported by the fact that social 
scientists typically need to obtain approval for their experiments from an ethics committee. 
And this requires them to reflect on, and commit to avoiding or mitigating, risks of harm to 
study participants and the public (Wassenaar and Mamotte [2012], p. 268; for an explicit 
statement of this requirement, see, e.g., the European Commission for Research and 
Innovation ([2018], p. 20). 
 
However, scientists are clearly not under an obligation to consider all possible harms of their 
professional actions. It is commonly accepted that the obligation only extends to harm that they 
can reasonably foresee (Douglas [2009]). Would the harm linked to self-fulfilling effects qualify 
as reasonably foreseeable?  
 
To be sure, many social scientists or their peers might not be aware of the connection between 
their PST and its potential self-fulfilling effects. But consider, for instance, a member of hiring 
committees. Suppose they lack of awareness of implicit bias. Given (i) their social role and (ii) 
the now available wealth of empirical evidence on implicit biases, it seems clear that committee 
members should be aware of implicit bias even if they do not in fact do so (for further support, 
see Washington and Kelly [2014]).27  
 
Similarly, notice that the data on descriptive norms and their impact on behavior and cognition, 
too, have been known for about 30 years now (Cialdini et al. [1990]). Given this point and the 
fact that institutional boards (i.e., ethics committees) explicitly require scientists to assess and 
limit potential risks of social harm related to their research, it seems equally clear that social 
scientists too should be aware of PST self-fulfilling effects too. After all, it is hard to see why the 
social role specific obligation on scientists to assess and limit risks of social harm that ethics 
committees confer on them prior to conducting an experiment should ceases to hold afterward 
and with respect to other professional actions including the communication of the results to the 
public. It is plausible, then, to hold that social scientists28 have the following responsibility: 
 
Communicative Risk Anticipation 
Scientists should assess whether their PST is likely to have detrimental self-fulfilling 
effects and consider adopting strategies to mitigate the risks of them.  
 
Communicative Risk Anticipation is modest. While it requires scientists to analyze the risks of their 
																																																								
27 Thanks to Dan Kelly here for drawing my attention to this externalist line of thought.  
28 It seems plausible to hold that science reporters (not only social scientists) providing PST have this kind of 
responsibility and related obligation too. However, the basis for this normative claim is less clear than in the case 
of scientists. A separate argument is needed; for a helpful thought experiment to developed one, see Washington 
and Kelly [2014]. To keep the discussion focused, I shall set science reporters aside here.  
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PST and consider implementing ways of reducing them, it does not yet ask them to in fact 
adopt strategies to avoid problematic self-fulfilling effects related to descriptive norms. This 
matters because, as acknowledged above, there could be cases where the negative consequences 
of PST self-fulfilling effects are outweighed by the PST’s benefits.  Consider, for instance, the 
earlier PST example: ‘Britons are uniquely reluctant to wear COVID-19 face masks’. This 
claim might disincline Britons in the audience from wearing masks. But it could also be 
precisely what policymakers need to know in order to implement a mask mandate. If so, the 
public communication of that information need not necessarily reduce mask wearing among the 
public. Given these (and other)29 complexities, a blanket requirement on scientists to adopt 
ways of avoiding descriptive norms related negative self-fulfilling effects would be too strong.  
 
Still, the preceding sections suggest that these effects are likely to arise in a wide range of cases. 
Scientists should thus factor them in. Communicative Risk Anticipation captures this point. 
Suppose, then, that in line with Communicative Risk Anticipation, scientists have assessed the self-
fulfilling effects of their PST and wish to adopt strategies to mitigate the related risks. What 
strategies are there? 
 
5 Counteracting the Problem: A Proposal 
 
One possible way of reducing the risk of problematic self-fulfilling effects of PST might be to 
change the linguistic structure of the PST. There are different ways of doing so depending on 
the content of the claims at issue and the type of descriptive norm that they convey. Elsewhere I 
focus on PST about political polarization and propose three different linguistic modifications of 
it (Peters [2020a]). Here I shall elaborate, refine, and further defend one of them, the one that 
strikes me as the most attractive and easily adoptable strategy. It involves explicit restrictions of 
the generality of PST. 
 
5.1 Mind the generics and broad generalizations 
 
The guiding thought is that the easier it is for subjects to generalize social scientific claims to 
most members of groups, the higher the likelihood that they will construe these claims as 
conveying descriptive norms. For these norms refer to features or behavior common (rather 
than infrequent) among people (Cialdini et al. [1990]). Now, there is evidence that social 
scientific results expressed with generic language tend to be viewed as more generalizable than 
findings expressed with non-generic language (DeJesus et al. [2019]). To reduce the risk of 
harmful self-fulfilling effects of their PST, then, scientists and science communicators might 
decrease their use of generics and replace them with quantified statements referring to specific 
samples.  
																																																								
29 Adding further complications, the effects of PST depend partly on who the PST audience is (e.g., different 
political orientation might lead to different trust assignments and information uptake; Nisbet et al. [2015]). And 
while some PST might necessarily be directed at a particular audience with particular needs, it may be picked up 
and disseminated beyond those for whom it is intended (e.g., by other individuals who believe they understand the 
study but lack the expertise to understand the caveats and limitations). Thus, in some cases, the potential effects of 
PST are not easy to determine. Still, in line with Communicative Risk Anticipation, scientists ought to assess these 
effects when thinking about their PST. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer here. 
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Granted, if the quantified expressions to replace the generics and other broad generalizations in 
the PST could only be ‘all’ or ‘most’ so as to preserve accuracy, then even with this rephrasing, 
PST would remain problematic for the same reason as before. However, notice that, as 
Henrich et al. ([2010)] found, 
 
Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and 
behavior in the world’s top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, 
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers – often 
implicitly – assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that 
these ‘standard subjects’ are as representative of the species as any other population. (p. 
61) 
 
Henrich et al. went on to show that these assumptions are not justified. By reviewing the 
comparative database from across the behavioral sciences, they found that there is ‘substantial 
variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly 
unusual compared with the rest of the species – frequent outliers’ (Henrich et al. [2010)], p. 
61).  
 
While ten years have passed since Henrich et al.’s paper, there is reason to believe that key 
aspects of the problem that the paper highlighted still persist today. For instance, Simons et al. 
([2017]) note: ‘Psychological scientists draw inferences about populations based on samples – 
of people, situations, and stimuli – from those populations. Yet, few papers identify their target 
populations, and even fewer justify how or why the tested samples are representative of 
broader populations’ (p. 1123).  
 
Indeed, in a study already mentioned above, DeJesus et al. ([2019]) analyzed more than 1,000 
psychology articles and found not only that ‘generics were ubiquitously used to convey results’, 
but also that there was ‘no evidence that [the use of generics] was warranted by stronger 
evidence, as it was uncorrelated with sample size. Instead, authors showed an overwhelming 
tendency to treat limited samples as supporting general conclusions, by means of universalizing 
statements’ (p. 18375). In fact, scientists often used generics despite omitting information on 
sample features (e.g. socio-economic status) or having only small or unrepresentative samples 
(e.g., Western, white, middle-class etc.) as a basis. Strikingly, authors failing to mention, for 
instance, socio-economic status tended to use more generics than those who did mention it 
(DeJesus et al. ([2019]), p. 18373).  
 
Taken together, Henrich et al.’s, Simons et al.’s, and DeJesus et al.’s observations suggest that 
many generics and other broad generalizations currently found in PST in articles freely 
accessible online can be replaced with claims involving quantifiers other than ‘all’ or ‘most’ in 
the description of the samples. Since doing so helps reduce the risk that the public is exposed to 
socially harmful self-fulfilling effects related to descriptive norms, there is (given Communicative 
Risk Anticipation) a reason for scientists to adopt this strategy.  
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5.2 An independent epistemic rationale 
 
Such a replacement would, in fact, not only help reduce harmful self-fulfilling effects of PST for 
the public, but also contribute to epistemically better scientific conduct. After all, if the sample 
of a study is only small or the results only pertain to people with, say, a certain socio-economic 
status, then clearly scientists ought to communicate these facts to their audience, be it other 
scientists or the public, and not gloss over exceptions and variability by using, say, generics. 
Basic epistemic norms of scientific accuracy require it (Resnik [2005], p. 48; Forge [2008]). 
Relatedly, focusing specifically on intra-scientific communication, Simons et al. ([2017]) 
propose that publications should include ‘Constraints on Generality (COG)’ statements that 
identify and justify target populations for the reported findings because:  
 
Explicitly defining the target populations will help other researchers to sample from the 
same populations when conducting a direct replication, and it could encourage follow-up 
studies that test the boundary conditions of the original finding. Universal adoption of 
COG statements would change publishing incentives to favor a more cumulative science. 
(p. 1123) 
 
Notice that broad, generic generalizations formed on the basis of only small samples are not 
necessarily inaccurate. This is because generics do not imply that all members of the group 
described have a certain property. They allow for exceptions and counterevidence (‘Mosquitos 
carry malaria’ is a true generic, yet it only applies to 1% of all mosquitos) (Leslie [2017]). It 
might thus seem that when scientists use generics even though their samples are only small (or 
outliers), they do not yet violate norm of scientific accuracy.  
 
However, this would overlook the following. Cimpian et al. ([2010]) found that while generic 
claims of the form ‘Ps (e.g., men etc.) are f (e.g., resist green behavior, etc.)’ are generally 
accepted on relatively weak evidence, when they are unfamiliar with P, subjects construe such 
claims strongly as conveying that almost all Ps are f. Generics in PST thus involve an ambiguity 
that leads different people (e.g., scientific experts vs. non-experts) to different interpretations 
depending on their expertise concerning P. 30  This ambiguity or openness to different 
interpretations itself is in tension with scientific accuracy. Because if a particular empirical claim 
has been experimentally supported only with a specific sample, then even though using a 
generic might not involve making a false claim, it would still be inaccurate in that it leaves the 
social reference class of the claim more indeterminate than the experimental data warrant. It 
inaccurately suggests generalizability or ‘projectability’ (Munton [2020]) where the data may 
not support it. Replacing broad generic generalizations with specific and explicitly quantified 
claims thus helps improve scientific accuracy. 
 
It is worth noting too that a number of philosophers have argued that hearing and using generics 
makes subjects significantly more likely to ‘essentialize’ social kinds such as, for instance, racial 
or gender groups (Langton et al. [2012]; Leslie [2017]): generics are thought to lead people to 
																																																								
30 Thanks to Olivier Lemeire for comments on this point. 
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believe that there is some hidden and stable property or underlying nature shared by members 
of the kind at issue that causally grounds their common properties and dispositions (e.g., 
‘Latinos are temperamental’, ‘women are nurturing’). Langton et al. ([2012]) hold that generics 
in claims about gender or race groups should thus be rejected because they are ‘false, and 
politically problematic’, presenting ‘social artifacts as [e.g.] racial [gender etc.] essences’ (p. 
765). To counteract such essentialization, Langton et al. ([2012]) plausibly propose that we 
should convey the content of generics differently, namely by an ‘explicitly quantified 
statement’ involving ‘some’, ‘most’, or ‘all’ (765). Leslie ([2017]) adds that hearing generics 
inclines individuals not only to essentialize those classified by the generics but also to more 
readily apply stereotypes to them (p. 416).  
 
5.3 Combining ethical and epistemic considerations 
  
Given the preceding points, I thus propose the following strategy for reducing the risk of 
negative self-fulfilling effects of PST. It extends Simons et al.’s suggestion that scientists should 
include COG statements in their publications from intra-scientific to public scientific testimony: 
 
PST Generality Constraint 
In the absence of overriding ethical, epistemic, or feasibility considerations, scientists 
should ensure that the generalizations in their PST contain an explicitly quantified 
relativization to the population(s) to which they pertain and are not broader than 
warranted by the evidence. 
 
Following PST Generality Constraint has significant benefits. Given the points from the previous 
section, it helps (1) decrease the risk of negative self-fulfilling effects tied to PST, (2) reduce 
scientific inaccuracy related to over-generalizations, and (3) counteract social essentialization 
and stereotyping.  
 
Moreover, PST Generality Constraint is attractively modest. It does not say that scientists should 
always avoid broad generalizations in their PST. Due to the qualifier ‘in the absence of 
overriding ethical, epistemic, and feasibility considerations’, it allows for cases in which using, 
for instance, generics would be justified, say, to ensure people’s well-being, to counteract 
social injustice (Ritchie [2019]), or for feasibility reasons (e.g., when scientists or science 
reporters have little time/space to give an opinion online, on TV, etc.; Gerken [2020]).  
 
Granted, settling whether certain considerations would override the communicative practice 
proposed might not always be easy. But it seems clear that this is often unproblematic. For 
instance, with respect to several examples of claims (1)-(10), there are unlikely to be ethical, 
epistemic, or feasibility concerns overriding the benefits of rephrasing these claims with 
explicitly quantifications and relativization to specific samples. For example, assuming that the 
evidential basis permits it, ‘Men resist green behavior as unmanly’, ‘Americans eat too much 
processed meat’, and ‘People on social media are quick to repeat something that’s wrong’ could 
be easily rephrased thus: ‘Many men in the U.S. resist green behavior as unmanly’, ‘Many 
White, middle-class Americans eat too much processed meat’, and ‘Many people using Facebook 
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are quick to repeat something that’s wrong’. In fact, even if there are overriding conditions 
against such rephrasing, following PST Generality Constraint would still help improve the current 
provision of PST. For social scientists would then first need to consider the potential pernicious 
descriptive norms related effects of their PST and check them against other potential 
harms/benefits before testifying.31  
 
Having said that, following PST Generality Constraint does not eliminate all potential detrimental 
self-fulfilling effects of PST. For even when it involves explicitly quantified claims, PST might 
often pertain to a majority of individuals. In these cases, the risk of the emergence of 
problematic effects related to descriptive norms will persist. But even so, since currently much 
PST involves over-generalizations (Simons et al. [2017]; DeJesus et al. [2019]) following PST 
Generality Constraint can significantly ethically and epistemically improve the current practice of 
providing PST.  
 
6 Conclusion 
 
Communicating scientific data to the public is important to inform public deliberation and 
democratic decision-making. Yet, it also involves serious risks. Here I focused on an intriguing 
one of them: social scientific claims about negative features of individuals, groups, society, or 
social structures can cause cognitive and behavioral changes contributing to the self-fulfillment 
of these claims. I provided reasons to believe that this is likely to happen frequently and result 
in a wide range of harmful upshots (e.g., environmentally unfriendly behavior, low voter 
turnout, proliferation of ‘fake news’, bias against women, etc.). I argued that this problem is 
tied to many people’s tendency to conform to descriptive norms. Social scientists should factor 
this tendency in when they are about to provide PST. This is because they have a responsibility 
to consider the potential harm resulting from their professional actions, including the 
communication of research results to the public. I introduced one possible strategy with which 
the risk of negative self-fulfilling effects of PST related to descriptive norms can be decreased, 
namely to ensure that the generalizations in the PST (a) contain an explicitly quantified 
relativization to the population(s) to which they pertain, and (b) are not broader than 
warranted by the evidence. This strategy might in some cases be overridden by other 
considerations and may not eliminate all the harmful effects related to people’s conformist 
responding to descriptive norms. Still, it can help counteract them, and it is independently well 
motivated by the fact that it increases scientific accuracy.  
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31 PST Generality Constraint also coheres well with, and can be added to, other recently defended guidelines for 
scientists and science reporters to avoid causing ethical and/or epistemic harm via PST (see, e.g., Gerken [2018]; 
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